



Recent studies have shown that discrimination is still a barrier for minority groups 
in the labour market. Using large-scale field experiments, Bertrand & 
Mullainathan (2004), Kaas & Manger (2012) and Baert et al. (Forthcoming) 
provide direct evidence for hiring discrimination based on ethnicity: job 
applications with native names receive between 14 and 50 percent more positive 
callbacks than applications with non-native names in the US, Germany and 
Belgium. However, identifying discrimination is one thing; tackling it is another.  
To combat labour market discrimination effectively, we need to understand its 
underlying mechanisms. As reviewed by Guryan & Charles (2013), the leading 
explanations for labour market discrimination still go back to the theoretical 
models of taste-based discrimination, as introduced by Becker (1957), and 
statistical discrimination, as introduced by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973). In the 
model of taste-based discrimination, members of the majority experience a 
disutility from interacting with minority workers and are willing to pay a financial 
price to avoid such interactions. Becker (1957) describes three sources of 
discriminatory tastes: employers, co-workers and customers. Statistical 
discrimination occurs when employers examine statistics about a group’s average 
performance to predict a particular applicant’s productivity as a time-efficient and 
profit-maximising response to imperfect information about the actual productivity 
of the individual job candidate. 
As reviewed by Guryan & Charles (2013), most papers attempting to answer 
the question whether taste-based or statistical discrimination is a more 
appropriate explanation for unequal treatment in the labour market have 
conducted indirect assessments: they have measured whether particular patterns 
in economic data square predictions of the model being tested. The problem with 
this literature is that testing between the two models is only convincing to the 
degree that a particular pattern is explicable exclusively by one model, a challenge 
that is, as shown by Guryan & Charles (2013), rarely met. Recent work, however, 
has attempted to test more essential arguments of the taste-based model or the 
statistical discrimination model in explaining labour market discrimination (see 
Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; List, 2004; Autor & Scarborough, 2008; Charles & 
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Guryan, 2008; Kaas & Manger, 2012). Still, the aforementioned contributions fall 
short in two aspects. First, notwithstanding their ingenious research design, these 
contributions are not able to test both models of discrimination within one 
framework. Second, these contributions test key outcomes of the models but not 
the attitudes at the base of these models.  
Employing a vignette experiment, we directly measure aversion to interacting 
with ethnic minorities on the one hand and negative perceptions regarding the 
average productivity characteristics of these minorities on the other hand in 
respect of (testers in their role of) employers making their (fictitious) hiring 
decisions. Second, we investigate whether the tested attitudes explain 
discriminatory behaviour based on ethnicity.1 In addition to its potential to 
deepen academic understandings of how discrimination affects the labour 
market, our outcomes are relevant from a policy designing perspective and can 
generate new methods to detect discrimination in the labour market. 
2 Experimental Design 
We report on the results of a vignette study conducted in November 2013 (after a 
pilot experiment in October 2013). We recruited 268 participants from the 
undergraduate Microeconomics classes at Ghent University in Flanders, the Dutch 
speaking northern half of Belgium. These testers were each 19 or 20 years old.2 
An incentive for participation in the vignette study was provided. All participants 
were entered in a lottery and made a significant chance to win a 20 euro voucher. 
After being seated, they received an envelope with a booklet containing the 
experimental instructions. At the beginning of this booklet, testers were informed 
                                                     
1 In this aspect, our study complements Zussman (2013) who studies whether attitudes related to the models of 
taste-based and statistical discrimination can explain discriminatory behaviour in the Israeli product market. 
2 Hosoda et al. (2003) and Falk et al. (2013) show that both in general and also more specifically in judging job 
candidates, students’ ratings are nearly identical to those of professionals. Moreover, these subjects are less 
likely to respond in a socially desirable manner as one could expect them to be less worried about the reputation 
of the occupation of the recruiter.   
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about their role as a recruiter for the position of a counter assistant for a company 
selling building material. In addition, we mentioned some requirements for 
adequately performing this task, such as being customer-oriented, service-minded 
and sales-oriented. 
Then, the testers were asked to judge the resume of a fictitious candidate for 
this position. This resume revealed a graduate living in Ghent who had left school 
in June 2013 holding a secondary education degree in commerce. In addition, we 
added the following features: Belgian nationality, Dutch as a mother tongue, 
adequate French, English and German language skills, driving license, computer 
skills and student employment experience. The only aspect in which the resumes 
differed (the experimental manipulation) between participants was the name of 
the candidate. Alternatively the typically Flemish sounding (native) name “Jonas 
Vermeulen” or the typically Turkish sounding name “Emre Sahin” was assigned to 
the application.3 
Based on this information, the testers were asked to complete four tasks. 
First, they had to complete a manipulation check in which we tested their 
perception of the origin (and to not give away the aim of the experiment, also the 
sex and residence) of the applicant. Second, the testers were asked to state their 
intention to hire. More concretely, they had to indicate the likelihood with which 
they would (i) invite the candidate for a job interview and (ii) hire him as a counter 
assistant. Third, they were asked to rank their agreement with seven statements, 
related to views defined in the theory of taste-based and statistical discrimination. 
Last, participants completed a post-experimental survey in which we gathered 
information on their gender, social background, political ideology (using the short 
version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale presented by Zakrisson 
(2005)) and need for closure (adopting the 15-item NFC scale developed by Roets 
& Van Hiel (2011)). The latter characteristics were included in the mediation 
analysis outlined in Section 4 to test whether the explanatory power of the 
aforementioned statements regarding discriminatory behaviour did not reflect 
                                                     
3 Turkish names were used as the Turkish community forms the most significant ethnic minority in Ghent and as 
typical Flemish and Turkish names can be easily distinguished. The particular names were the same as those in 




other dynamics. All statements and scale items were scored on a 7-point Likert 
scale, except for the NFC scale, of which the items were scored on a 6-point Likert 
scale. 
Vignette studies are not conducted as frequently as field experiments and lab 
experiments by economists – a recent example is Stephan et al. (In Press). 
However, this kind of experiments is often used in other research fields such as 
psychology and sociology. The success of vignette experiments in these fields is 
related to the fact that self-report measures on perceptions have been shown to 
correlate highly with actual behaviour (De Dreu et al., 2001) and changes in 
intentions clearly result in actual behavioural changes (Webb and Sheeran, 2006). 
Furthermore, the choice for a vignette study as research method addresses some 
limitations of experimental lab studies, which have been criticised for making too 
much abstraction of real life situations, raising questions about the external 
validity or generalisability of findings (Colquitt, 2008; Shadish et al., 2002). The use 
of a scenario allows to describe the context in which participants define their 
intentions more realistic while establishing valid causal relationships (Mook, 
1983). 
3 Explicit Attitudes towards Ethnic Minorities: Supporting 
Taste-based or Statistical Discrimination? 
Table 1 describes the data gathered in the experiment described in the former 
section. In this table, we compare the average values for the manipulation check, 
participant characteristics, attitudes towards the fictitious job candidate and 
hiring intentions between both groups of participants, classified by the ethnicity 
of their assigned job candidate. Panel A shows that our experimental 
manipulation worked: there is a significant difference in perception of the Flemish 
and Turkish job candidates as being of non-native origin. Panel B also shows that 
the randomisation of this manipulation over the testers worked: both groups of 
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testers are very similar in gender, social background, political ideology and need 
for closure.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Panel C enables us to judge aversion for cross-group contact in respect of our 
participants in their role as an employer. The three statements in this panel are 
closely related to the definition of employer discrimination, co-worker 
discrimination and customer discrimination within the taste-based discrimination 
framework of Becker (1957). Through the first statement, “As an employer, I will 
enjoy collaborating with this candidate”, we gauge the ground for employer 
discrimination related to our participants in a direct way. The average score for 
this statement is comparable between the experimental group that received a 
resume with a Flemish sounding name and the one that received a Turkish 
sounding name. We get a totally different picture when we monitor the average 
scores for the statements related to co-worker discrimination (“My co-workers 
will enjoy collaborating with this candidate”) and customer discrimination (“My 
customers will enjoy collaborating with this candidate”). For these statements, the 
average score for the job applicant with the native sounding name is substantially 
higher than the score for the job applicant with the non-native sounding name. 
These statistics provide initial evidence for an important ground of discrimination: 
the concern that co-workers and customers will prefer collaborating with native 
individuals. 
In Panel D, we depict the scores on four statements related to the perceived 
productivity of the candidate. Significant values in column (3) can, by 
construction, only be determined by perceptions regarding aggregate differences 
in productivity across the ethnic groups and thereby point in the direction of 
grounds for statistical discrimination. On the one hand, the results in Panel D are 
somewhat unexpected, as the average score of the statement “This person will 
deliver the required productivity for this job” is higher for the Turkish job 
candidate and the score for the statement “This candidate will be often on sick 
leave” is lower for the Turkish job candidate. On the other hand, we get a lower 
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mean score for Turkish candidates on the statement “This person belongs to a 
group of people who, on average, perform well in the labour market”. 
To sum up, our testers themselves do not seem to have prejudices about the 
non-native worker’s productivity – rather the opposite is true – but they are 
aware of the unfavourable position of these minorities due to reasons beyond 
their scope. One can argue that they might have prejudices with respect to (the 
discriminatory behaviour of) their co-workers, customers and other economic 
agents. 
The scores for the items in Panel C and Panel D were clustered into two scales 
(after reverse scoring the last two statements of Panel D).4 Overall, as driven by 
the items indicating co-worker and customer discrimination, the scale related to 
taste-based discrimination is significantly higher for the job applicant with the 
native name. The scale capturing attitudes related to statistical discrimination 
does not differ significantly by the origin of the candidate.  
4 Explicit Attitudes and Discriminatory Behaviour 
In the former section, we provided suggestive evidence for grounds for taste-
based discrimination against Turkish minorities. The question is now whether the 
attitudes pointing at co-worker and customer discrimination result in 
discriminatory behaviour towards the job candidate. In other words, do the tested 
views defined in the theory of taste-based discrimination together mediate 
unequal hiring chances for candidates of ethnic minorities? To answer this 
question, we perform a mediation analysis applying the state-of-the-art PROCESS 
procedure as described in Hayes (2013). The results of the benchmark analysis, 
using the likelihood of getting invited for a job interview as an outcome, are 
depicted in Figure 1.  
 
                                                     
4 The Chronbach’s alpha for the former (latter) scale is 0.85 (0.61). Eliminating one of the statements does not 
increase this statistic. 
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FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The total effect of presenting a job candidate of non-native (Turkish) origin on 
the likelihood of an invitation for job interview is, as we could expect based on the 
statistics presented in Panel E of Table 1, not significantly different from 0 (c = 
0.04, SE = 0.15).5 This total effect can be separated into a direct effect and indirect 
effects via the mediating variables: the scales of taste-based discrimination and 
statistical discrimination (as defined in the previous section). The direct effect, 
indicating whether the hiring decision is affected by the candidate’s ethnicity after 
controlling for the mediating models of discrimination, is not significant (c’ = 0.07, 
SE = 0.13). 
 Most interesting, however, are the estimated indirect effects. Concerning the 
mediating effect of the cluster of views defined in the theory of taste-based 
discrimination, we find, in line with the statistics presented in Panel C of Table 1, a 
significantly negative effect of non-native origin on the candidate’s score for these 
views (a1 = -0.39, SE = 0.10). In addition, we get a significantly positive effect of 
the recruiter’s judgment of the candidate concerning these views on the 
likelihood of inviting this candidate (b1 = 0.25, SE = 0.09). Multiplying the 
estimation coefficients leads to a significantly negative mediation effect (a1b1 = -
0.10, SE = 0.04)6, and our results thereby provide evidence for the mechanisms 
captured by the model of taste-based discrimination as explaining unequal 
treatment in the labour market. Concerning the attitudes related to statistical 
discrimination, we find no significant mediation effect (a2b2 = 0.06, SE = 0.06) due 
to the fact that the scores for these attitudes are, taken together, not affected by 
the ethnicity of the candidates. 
Alternative analyses (i) using the hiring likeliness as an outcome, (ii) leaving 
out the attitudes related to statistical discrimination as a mediator or (iii) adding 
gender, father’s education level, the scales indicating right-wing authoritarianism 
or need for closure as a parallel mediator yield the same conclusions. 
                                                     
5 When discussing our results, we focus on the significance and the sign of the coefficients because their value 
has no useful substantive interpretation for non-continuous variables (Hayes, 2013). 




We conducted a vignette study to test the empirical importance of views defined 
in theories of taste-based and statistical discrimination. Our results provide 
evidence that co-worker and customer discrimination, as perceived by employers, 
underlie discrimination based on ethnicity in the labour market. 
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics of the Experimental Data 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Mean 
Difference:  







 N = 139 N = 139  
A. Manipulation check     
“The candidate is of a non-native origin.” 1.769 4.784 3.015*** [15.59] 
B. Tester characteristics     
Female sex 0.433 0.448 0.015 [0.245] 
Highest diploma father    
   Tertiary education: college 0.396 0.456 0.060 [0.061] 
   Tertiary education: outside college 0.328 0.254 -0.075 [0.134] 
   Secondary education 0.216 0.254 0.037 [0.718] 
   Lower than secondary education 0.058 0.037 -0.022 [0.851] 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale 3.302 3.304 0.002 [0.028] 
Need for Closure (NFC) scale 3.803 3.751 -0.051 [0.538] 
C. Attitudes related to model of taste-based discrimination 
“As an employer, I will enjoy collaborating with this 
candidate.” 
4.739 4.597 -0.142 [1.237] 
“My co-workers will enjoy collaborating with this 
candidate.” 
4.739 4.284 -0.455*** [4.516] 
“My customers will enjoy collaborating with this 
candidate.” 
4.806 4.239 -0.567*** [4.684] 
Average score on these statements 4.761 4.373 -0.388*** [3.949] 
D. Attitudes related to model of statistical discrimination 
“This person will deliver the required productivity for this 
job” 
4.799 5.194 0.396*** [2.922] 
“This person belongs to a group of people who, on 
average, perform well in the labour market” 
4.211 3.530 -0.681*** [4.463] 
“By engaging this person I will take a risk.” 3.567 3.276 -0.291 [1.548] 
“This candidate will be often on sick leave.” 3.030 2.627 -0.403*** [2.727] 
Average score on these statements 4.608 4.705 0.098 [0.899] 
E. Hiring intentions    
“I will invite this candidate for a first interview.” 5.731 5.761 0.030 [0.206] 
“The probability with which I will engage this candidate is 
high.” 
4.545 4.582 0.037 [0.246] 
Note. All statements and scale items were scored on a 7-point Likert scale, except for the NFC scale, of which the 
items were scored on a 6-point Likert scale. t-tests are performed to test whether the difference presented in column 
(3) is significantly different from zero. *** (**) ((*)) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. t-




















Note. The presented results are non-standardised estimation coefficients following the PROCESS procedure as 
described in Hayes (2013). Standard errors are between parentheses. *** (**) ((*)) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) 







Attitudes towards candidate 
related to taste-based 
discrimination 
Attitudes towards candidate 
related to statistical 
discrimination 
Invitation to a job interview 
a1 = -0.39*** (0.10) b1 = 0.25*** (0.09) 
c = 0.04 (0.15) 
c’ = 0.07 (0.13) 
 
a2 = 0.11 (0.11) b2 = 0.55*** (0.08) 
